"Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics Working Paper 2016-7" is now available
Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics Working Paper 2016-7
Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics issues the series of Working Paper to highlight our recent research activities.
The latest issue, 2016-7: Makoto Hagiwara, Double Implementation with Partially Honest Agents.
- Title of original paper
- Double Implementation with Partially Honest Agents
- Makoto Hagiwara
- Theoretical studies usually assume that all agents are self-interested. On the other hand, we consider that there are some partially honest agents in the sense of Dutta and Sen. If all agents are self-interested, Maskin monotonicity and no veto power are together sufficient for double implementation in Nash equilibria and undominated Nash equilibria (Jackson et al., Tatamitani, and Yamato ). We show that if at least one agent is partially honest, no veto power is sufficient for double implementation with partially honest agents. Therefore, we no longer need Maskin monotonicity as a necessary condition of double implementability. Moreover, we show that if at least two agents are partially honest, unanimity is sufficient for double implementation with partially honest agents.
Following issues of Working Paper will appear as soon as available.